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1 Introduction
Relying on samples taken from developing and developed countries, several recent papers,
such as those by Fajnzylber et al. (2002), Soares (2004) and Neumayer (2003, 2005), have
emphasized the influence of macro-economic variables on crime. Those studies highlight
the impact of the average level of income and of its growth rate. But none of them consider
the impact of its instability.
This paper argues that the factors corresponding to economic shocks or macro-economic
instability have a significant and robust influence on crime. It suggests that this influence
comes from disappointed anticipations, formed during periods of rapid increase of income,
which, to some extent, generates frustration and possibly crime. It also suggests that ille-
gal activities are used by some agents to compensate their loss of income and, in this way,
smooth their consumption. It mainly deals with the direct effect of instability on crime.
Nevertheless, since macro instability reduces growth, as it has been largely substantiated
in literature, and growth has been found to have a negative impact on crime, it can also
be supposed to have an indirect effect on crime through the growth rate.
We tested our hypothesis of a direct effect of macro instability for two kinds of crime:
the utmost crime against persons, homicide, and crime against property, robbery. The
samples are those used by Neumayer (2003) for homicide and Neumayer (2005) for robbery.
Those samples both cover a set of developed and developing countries during the 1980-
97 period and are much larger than those previously used by Fajnzylber et al. (2002).
Results support the hypothesis that income instability has a significant influence upon
crime. They are more outstanding for homicide than for robbery.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual framework
for identifying variables usually considered as determinants of crime and for discussing the
effects of instability and volatility on crime. Section 3 presents the data and samples and
explains how instability indicators are built. Results are analyzed in section 4. Section 5
concludes.
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2 Conceptual framework
2.1 “Traditional” variables
According to the economic theory of crime initiated by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973),
criminals, like other individuals, are supposed to maximize their expected utility and react
to incentives. Crime is seen as a consequence of a rational allocation of time between
legal and illegal activities. In other words, each agent compares his or her expected
earnings in the legal and illegal sectors, and becomes a criminal if illegal income is higher.
This choice is largely influenced by deterrence or, more precisely, by the probability of
apprehension and the size of punishment: the number of crimes committed decreases with
the importance of deterrence. As a consequence, a large part of the literature dealing with
determinants of crime focuses on the effect of deterrence1.
This literature also tries to identify variables which are considered as “traditional”
determinants of crime, even if their effect is not always clear. This is particularly the
case for the average level of income. On the one hand, a higher average income results
in more opportunities in the legal labor market thus leading to a reduction in crime
against property. On the other hand, it also increases opportunities for criminals since
there are more goods to steal. Similar arguments also apply to income growth so that
the overall effect of these two variables is undetermined. Another hypothesis recently
advanced by Neumayer (2005), concerns the effect of income inequality upon crime. Crime
against property may be seen as an attempt by the poorest to reduce the gap between
their own income and the income of the richer parts of the population. Furthermore,
income inequality reduces the opportunity cost of crime, at least for the poor. Finally,
relative deprivation induced by inequality generates frustration and increases violence. As
a consequence, a positive effect of inequality on crime is expected. However, this effect is
not always seen as significant in empirical studies, particularly at a macro-economic level.
Several explanations have been given for this result, including a lack of data for a large
number of countries and a lack of temporal variation of the variable used (generally, the
Gini index).
1See Fajnzylber et al. (2000) and Fougère et al. (2005) for a review.
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The theoretical model developed by Becker (1968) is possibly not adapted for explain-
ing violent crime without any economic concern since it is unlikely that an individual
makes a rational analysis before committing an assault or a murder. Further additional
theoretical background is needed to explain this kind of crime. Neumayer (2003) singles
out three theories to explain violence. Firstly, the modernization theory suggests that
the process of modernization in a given country increases violence because previous social
control mechanisms are destroyed, in partly due to urbanization: the process leads to an
alienation of individuals (particularly those who were unable to adapt to this new type
of society), and to an anomie situation (absence of norms), which can lead to an increase
of violence. Secondly, the opportunity theory suggests that crime increases if the oppor-
tunities for criminals increase: these opportunities can be pecuniary as well as social and
demographic, justifying the use of population density or the percentage of young males in
the population as “pro-crime” variables. The third theory, quoted by Neumayer (2003), is
cultural: crime varies following cultural differences amongst countries (or amongst groups
within a country). Hereafter we will refer to this classification when analyzing the impact
of instability on crime.
2.2 The effect of macro-economic instability
According to the modernization theory, individuals’ propensity to violence can be seen
to increase in a changing economic and social environment, firstly, because social con-
trol mechanisms are less efficient and secondly because individuals who are incapable of
adapting become frustrated. Macro-economic instability can thus influence crime through
this channel: instability warps anticipations, especially if it occurs due to macro-economic
shocks. If a country benefits from good economic perspectives, agents will have optimistic
expectations. Then, if a negative shock occurs, individuals will have to give up their as-
pirations. Not only are anticipations rendered more difficult, thus generating deception,
but, as the newly created needs cannot be satisfied, frustration increases and is more likely
to be translated into violence.
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Moreover, instability reduces the opportunity costs of crime against property by reduc-
ing opportunities in the legal sector. The wage the criminal could have earned by working
instead of committing a crime is uncertain if there is instability, thus rendering illegal
activities relatively less risky than what they would be in a situation without instability.
This argument is rather similar to the one used to link unemployment to crime: the fewer
opportunities there are in the legal labor market, the more attractive illegal activities be-
come, especially if they become regular (as in organized crime for example), enabling the
criminal to smooth his income and consumption. From this point of view, crime can be
considered as a kind of diversification of activities in order to protect oneself against cli-
mate or price shocks. Even if opportunities for criminals are also more uncertain, it seems
reasonable to assume that macro-economic instability increases crime against property
since it lowers its opportunity costs.
To some extent, instability can also increase homicides, since it can be seen as an
“efficient” way to reallocate resources after a shock. Miguel (2005) discovered that murders
of elderly women in rural Tanzania increase after extreme rainfalls (a negative income
shock leading to food shortage), the justification for these murders being that these women
were witches. In another paper, Miguel et al. (2004) find that income shock (instrumented
by rainfall variations) increases violence in Africa by raising the probability of civil war.
We should also keep in mind the indirect effect of instability on crime, through the
growth rate. A lot of studies have estimated the impact of export instability (or other
exogenous sources of instability) or of growth volatility on average growth in developing
countries (see Ramey & Ramey 1995, Guillaumont et al. 1999, Hnatkovska & Loayza 2004,
Guillaumont 2005). Indeed, instability by generating risk may increase precautionary
savings. But more significantly, it slows down, through several channels, productivity
improvement, innovation and finally the growth rate. If average growth (and thus the
level of income) has a negative effect upon crime, which is often assumed, then instability,
by reducing average growth, also indirectly increases crime. Since in our regressions, where
crime is explained by both the average level of income per capita and the growth rate,
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this effect is already captured, we must not forget that our analysis is focused on direct
effects, i.e. those which do not go through the level or the growth of income.
3 The data
3.1 Explained variables
Macro-economic analysis of crime suffered for a long time from the lack of quality data,
in particular because the legal definition of crime differed among countries. The United
Nations’ World Crime Surveys (WCS hereafter) filled this void. This dataset is built upon
surveys from governments, conducted in several waves by the United Nations since 1970,
and deals with the judiciary system as a whole (number of crimes committed, police size,
justice organization). However, they are official crime data, well-known to under-estimate
the true crime rates as not every crime is reported to the police. Moreover, they are issued
from surveys transmitted to governments, which implies firstly, that countries can choose
not to answer, and secondly, that the data cannot be verified.
It is therefore better, as much as possible, to use other sources. Firstly, one can use
data issued from the World Health Organization (WHO). These data contain, for every
country and every year, the number of deceases classified depending on the cause of the
death, with a specific category for homicide. Since these data come from the health
administration of each country, it is, a priori, more reliable than WCS data. Finally, data
for crime against persons as well as crime against property can be obtained from Interpol.
These data are collected directly from the police, which reduces the risk of manipulation
by the government or the likelihood of errors (even if WCS data more than likely come
from the same source). Moreover, Interpol data cover a larger number of countries than
the WCS and gives a more representative sample.
We used the databases of Neumayer (2003) for homicide and of Neumayer (2005)
for robbery2, which correspond to two panels of developing and developed countries for
2The databases are freely available on the website of the Journal of Peace Research:
http://www.prio.no/jpr.
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six 3-year periods covering the 1980-97 period. Homicide rates are taken mainly, and in
priority, from WHO data, considered as the more reliable source. The sample is completed
by Interpol data, where they exist. Robbery rates come exclusively from Interpol. We
thus have a sample of 132 countries for homicide and 87 for robbery, of which a large
number are developing countries. This is one of the advantages of the dataset used by
Neumayer compared to the one used by Fajnzylber et al. (2002), who use WCS data and
thus get a sample of only 45 countries for homicide and 34 for robbery. Furthermore, a
large part of the observations in their samples covers developed countries.
3.2 Traditional determinants
The baseline model includes economic, social, demographic and deterrence variables in
order to take into account the main determinants of violent crime. Economic variables are
the level of income, measured by the GDP per capita, the level of inequality (measured
by the Gini index) and the GDP growth rate, as in Fajnzylber et al. (2002). Concerning
the robbery rate, we are followed Neumayer (2005) and also introduced the squared GDP
per capita in order to take into account a possible non-linear relation between average
income and crime against property: At first, the number of robberies increases as average
income increases (because opportunities increase) but, as everybody gets richer on average
(whatever the distribution of wealth), incitation to commit a robbery decreases. In other
words, we can assume that there exists a Kuznets curve for robbery.
Social variables in the baseline model are the literacy rate as well as female labor force
participation. The latter is introduced as a proxy for the weakness of social linkage; with
the underlying assumption that a higher female labor force participation means lower
parental control, which tends to reduce social linkage between individuals. According
to Neumayer (2003), this variable measures the extent to which the traditional social
structure which is dominated by males in numerous countries, remains in place and is
thus a way to indirectly measure anomie. Some studies prefer to use the divorce rate and
some others, such as Glaeser & Sacerdote (1999), use the percentage of female-headed
households.
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The two demographic variables most often used are the percentage of young males in
the population and the urban rate. Young males are perceived as having a higher tendency
to be violent than the rest of population. However, we must remark that, unless we
assume there is a significant difference between male and female populations, this variable
measures in fact the youth of the population. The urban rate is expected to have a positive
impact on both homicide and robbery rates for three reasons, emphasized by Glaeser &
Sacerdote (1999). Firstly, urbanization goes hand in hand with a high population density,
which means more possibilities for criminals to hide. Secondly, the number of policemen
per capita is smaller in cities, reducing the probability of apprehension. Lastly, concerning
crime against property specifically, the high population density due to urbanization means
a lot of opportunities (and high potential of spoils) as well as a low cost of crime (especially
in terms of the distance to be covered).
Finally, we introduced a dummy variable indicating whether the death penalty exists
in each country and for each period in order to take into account the effect of deterrence on
crime. Variables generally used to measure deterrence, such as the number of policemen
per capita or the amount of police expenditure, suffer from an endogenous bias. If it is
possible to efficiently and elegantly overcome this problem when working on micro-data
(as carried out by Levitt Levitt 1997), it is much more difficult to find an exogenous source
of variation for that kind of variable at the macro-economic level. This is why we chose to
use the death penalty, which is, a priori, the more exogenous police variable at this level:
the existence of the death penalty in a country is mainly the consequence of a political
choice and is relatively independent from crime. Furthermore, the use of this variable
seems particularly relevant in the case of homicide, since it is generally used to punish
that kind of crime. Finally, this variable also has the advantage of not suffering from any
measurement error since the existence of the death penalty in a country is clearly known.
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3.3 Macro-economic instability variables
We distinguished two kinds of variables. The first one tried to measure exogenous sources
of macro-economic instability. The second one dealt with growth rate volatility, which
depends both on structural factors and on economic policy.
We considered two kinds of exogenous shocks which can lead to macro-economic insta-
bility. The first one comes from external trade fluctuations and is measured by calculating
the instability of exports in constant dollars, weighted by the share of exports in GDP.
The second one is bound to climate and is measured by the instability of agricultural
added value in constant dollars (also weighted by the share of agriculture in GDP). The
use of these variables seems relevant since our sample is taken from a lot of developing
countries, which are particularly vulnerable to these kinds of shocks. It should be recalled
that these two instabilities (not weighted) are among the components of the economic
vulnerability index (EVI) used by the United Nations for identifying the least developed
countries (United Nations 2000). We also built a similar indicator for the instability of
GDP per capita.
These instability measures are calculated as indices of the deviation of each variable
from a mixed trend, both deterministic and stochastic. We began by running the following
regression:
yi,t = αt + βyi,t−1 + c + ǫi,t (1)
where yi,t is the variable considered (agricultural value added, exports or GDP per
capita) for each country i and each year t. In this equation, we considered a ten-year
trend. We then computed the instability index as follows:
INSi,t = 100.
√√√√∑Tt
(
yi,t−yˆi,t
yˆi,t
)
2
N
(2)
where yˆi,t is the value of yi,t as predicted by equation 1, T is the length of the period
considered and N is the number of observations for the period. The indices are computed
for the last year of each three-year period covered by the sample (1982, 1985, 1988, 1991,
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1994 and 1997). In order to find which is the most relevant length of the period of insta-
bility leading to crime, several indices were computed, referring to instability respectively
during the four, five, six, eight and ten years preceding each year considered: we assume
the relevant length can be different for homicide and for robbery.
To check whether our results are sensitive to the instability measurement, we also built,
for each of the three variables used, an instability index with regards to a trend measured
by the Hodrick & Prescott (1997) filter. Instead of smoothing each variable with a simple
linear regression (like the one proposed in equation 1), we used this method, which allows
for a better smoothing of the series. We then computed an instability index following the
formula presented in equation 2 where yˆi,t corresponds to the smoothed variable (what
Hodrick & Prescott call the growth of the variable) and (yi,t−yˆi,t) corresponds to “cyclical”
variations.
We also computed a variable measuring growth volatility, which is, as used by Ramey &
Ramey (1995), the variance of the growth rate of GDP. Similarly to our work on instability,
this variance was computed for the last year of each three-year period on the four, five,
six, eight and ten preceding years.
Finally, the effect of instability may of course differ according to the institutional
environment and be a stronger effect the weaker institutions are. Similarly, it may be
expected to be lower in the OECD than in developing countries. Since this hypothesis
can only be tested using an OECD dummy variable, and since regressions are estimated
by using fixed effects, this dummy variable is introduced only as a multiplicative factor of
instability. In order to test more specifically the hypothesis that the quality of institutions
has an impact, we also introduced in regressions the composite international country risk
guide (ICRG) index, both additively and as a multiplicative factor of instability.
4 Results
Basic results are presented in Table 1 for homicide and Table 2 for robbery. We followed
Neumayer (2003, 2005) and used the fixed-effects estimator. We did not use the GMM
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estimator (used by Fajnzylber et al. 2002), even though it makes it possible to take into
account criminal inertia because it is not adapted to the structure and availability of our
data: this estimator actually requires the presence, for each country, of at least three
consecutive periods, but the analysis of data reveals that only the developed countries and
some intermediary-level income countries (most of them from Latin America) meet this
requirement. Using GMM would lead to a significant loss of information and a type of
selection bias as only the countries which have a reliable and efficient statistical system (as
well as a sufficient political control to make the government publish the statistics) would
be included in the sample. Moreover, in each and every regressions, we corrected, using
a bootstrap technique, the standard errors associated with instability variables since they
are generated variables leading to bias in the second-step estimation.
We carried out similar work for the two kinds of crime: column (1) of each table is the
baseline model, without any instability or volatility variable. This estimate includes both
the Gini index and literacy rate, which are further dropped because these two variables do
not have any significant effect and generate an important loss of observations. The Gini
index, which comes from the WIDER database, is a very incomplete series (especially for
developing countries) and has a small time variation. It is thus likely that the effect of this
variable will be taken into account by the cross-section fixed-effects or that unobservable
factors will have a simultaneous impact on both income inequality and crime, as suggested
by Bourguignon (2001). For this reason, Neumayer (2005) argues that the macro-economic
level may not be the most relevant one to study the link between inequality and crime.
Literacy rate, taken from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank has the
inverse bias since indicators for this variable do not contain any data for developed coun-
tries and also evidence slow variations over time. Therefore, we decided to drop these two
variables in the following regressions.
<Table 1 here>
<Table 2 here>
According to column (2) of Table 1, GDP per capita level and growth rate have sig-
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nificant negative effects on the homicide rate and the percentage of young males in the
population has a significant positive effect, as expected. However, the other control vari-
ables do not have any significant effect and the overall explanation power of the model is
rather weak (R2 around 0.15). This result, which suggests that most homicides remain un-
explained, is relatively frequent in literature (Fajnzylber et al. 2000): even if violence has
some objective determinants, it remains mostly a random phenomenon. This argument
is confirmed by the fact that the model is much more efficient for explaining the robbery
rate (column (2) of Table 2). As we expected, the death penalty is the only insignificant
variable, since it is normally not a sentence for robbery, and also because this variable does
not vary enough over time to have any effect. It should also be noted that the urbaniza-
tion rate has a surprisingly negative effect on robbery. Two explanations can be brought
forward. Firstly, in a study of crime in Madagascar, Fafchamps & Moser (2003) found
that it mainly occurs in the rural parts of the country and consists of cattle theft. Even
if this study deals with only one country with specific characteristics, its results suggest
the presence of a specific rural insecurity in developing countries. Furthermore, during
the period considered (1980-97), countries with the highest urbanization level relatively
to income were the developed ones, which also have smaller crime rates than developing
countries.
The following columns show the results of estimates including instability variables.
Columns (3) and (4) include the instability of agricultural added value and the instability
of exports for each kind of crime, column (4) presents results where instability is computed
when the trend is measured using the Hodrick & Prescott filter. These regressions were
run on a limited sample due to the lower number of observations for these two kinds of
instability. Finally, columns (5) to (7) include the instability of GDP per capita and the
growth rate volatility.
Column (3) of Table 1 suggests a significantly positive and equally important effect
of both agricultural added value and exports instabilities, even if it is rather small: a
1% increase in agricultural added value instability increases the homicide rate by 0.107%
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(0.11% for exports instability). Table 1 also shows a significantly positive effect of both
instability of GDP per capita and volatility of growth. If we turn to table 2, we can see
that these two variables also have a significantly positive effect on robbery, which is not the
case for the instability of agricultural added value and of exports. It seems that instability
of income and growth volatility are more likely to be a factor of income smoothing (in an
illegal manner) than exogenous shocks.
Let us now consider the evolution of the coefficients associated with instability when the
period over which instability is taken into account varies. Results are presented in Table
3 for homicide and 4 for robbery. Coefficients of instability variables presented in these
tables come from regressions identical to those presented in tables 1 and 2 respectively,
with the “length” of instability varying. As such, coefficients presented in tables 3 and 4
when instability is computed on 8 years are identical to those presented in tables 1 and
2. Table 3 suggests that the effect of instability on homicide, however it is measured,
decreases with the length of instability considered, even if it is always significant. Table
4 suggests the opposite behavior for the elasticity of robbery due to instability, namely
this elasticity increases when the period considered for measuring instability decreases,
though it is always insignificant for the agricultural added value and export instability. In
other words, robbery is more an immediate response to instability, suggesting that it is
actually used by some people to compensate for their income loss due to negative shocks
and therefore as a mean of smoothing their consumption. Homicide, on the other hand,
is a response to both short-term and long-term instability, which is consistent with the
hypothesis of a frustration effect. Moreover, higher coefficients associated with long-term
instability suggest that instability creates more anomie in the long run than in the short
run.
<Table 3 here>
<Table 4 here>
We finally tested whether the effect of instability on crime depends on the macro in-
stitutional environment. Firstly, tables 5 and 6 showcase results of estimates where a
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dummy variable indicating whether a given country belongs to the OECD, for homicide
and robbery respectively. As we have already pointed it out, this dummy variable can be
introduced only as a multiplicative factor of instability since we used a fixed-effects esti-
mator. Both tables show higher coefficients associated with instability variables on their
own, suggesting a higher effect of instability on crime in non-OECD countries. Since we
already controlled for the effect of the level of income (and its growth rate) on crime in each
regression, the OECD dummy variable can be assumed to mainly measure differences of
institutional environment between the two groups of countries. However, this variable has
several limitations; firstly, it is a very indirect measure of institutional quality. Secondly,
since it cannot be introduced additively, we are unable to estimate its direct effect.
<Table 5 here>
<Table 6 here>
In order to bypass these issues, we turned to another, more direct and more accurate
measurement of institutional quality, by using the composite ICRG index. However, since
the ICRG database only began in 1984, the introduction of this variable involves the
suppression of the first period covered and a drop in the number of observations. Results
are presented in tables 7 and 8 for homicide and robbery respectively. The coefficients
associated with the variable of interaction between instability and the ICRG composite
index tend to have the expected negative sign even if they are not always significant: the
weaker the institutions are, the stronger the effect of instability on crime. Furthermore,
the direct effect of instability variables is normally less significant than in the preceding
estimates. It suggests that once the direct effect of institutional quality on crime is taken
into account, the effect of instability is weaker, supporting the hypothesis that the impact
of instability on crime depends on the institutional environment. Finally, in most of the
regressions, the ICRG composite index has no direct significant effect on crime.
We also remarked that the elasticities of homicide to the instability of income and to
growth volatility are similar, while the level of the elasticities of robbery to instability
of income is about twice the level of its elasticities to growth volatility. Since instability
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of income is measured with regards to a mixed trend which already captures permanent
shocks through the lagged variable, while growth volatility reflects both permanent and
transitory shocks, we can consider that homicide does not react differently to transitory
and permanent shocks, while robbery reacts more to transitory than to permanent ones.
This is consistent with our hypothesis that instability influences robbery through the
need to smooth income, which is relatively more sensitive to transitory shocks than the
instability-induced frustration which is assumed to influence homicide.
<Table 7 here>
<Table 8 here>
5 Conclusion
This paper has considered the impact of macro-economic instability and volatility on crime
in an international perspective. Using a panel of developed and developing countries for
a maximum of six three-year periods from 1980 to 1997, estimates of the determinants of
crime suggest a positive effect of previous macro-economic instability (or growth volatility)
on homicide, assumed to be the result of frustration generated by instability, through
inaccurate expectations. Instability also leads to increases in robbery, which can be seen
as an illegal way of smoothing income. However, this impact of instability is significant
only in non-OECD countries, suggesting that the effect of instability on property crime
depends on the institutional environment. Of course, the instability variables considered
in this paper, as well as other economic variables examined in literature, can only explain
a fraction of crime committed.
These results evidence a negative effect of macro-economic instability, which, as far as
we know, has yet to be studied. They supplement arguments in favor of policies which
aim to reduce macro vulnerability to shocks in developing countries.
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Table 1: Determinants of homicide rate: simple model (fixed effects) of the impact of instability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HP HP
ln(GDP per capita) -0.491 -0.379 -0.159 -0.186 -0.293 -0.303 -0.287
(2.65)*** (4.29)*** (1.10) (1.28) (2.59)*** (2.69)*** (2.60)***
GDP growth rate -0.013 -0.007 -0.010 -0.009 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004
(2.06)** (2.50)** (2.02)** (1.81)* (1.18) (1.46) (1.04)
Death penalty 0.054 0.031 -0.016 -0.010 -0.025 -0.037 -0.047
(0.28) (0.38) (0.16) (0.10) (0.26) (0.39) (0.50)
Gini index -0.013
(1.66)
Literacy rate -0.008
(0.45)
Urbanization rate 0.014 -0.004 0.009 0.011 0.000 0.000 -0.000
(1.04) (0.66) (1.36) (1.50) (0.02) (0.05) (0.01)
Male 15-64 year-old -0.000 0.046 0.031 0.031 0.049 0.069 0.049
(0.01) (2.24)** (0.95) (0.96) (2.25)** (2.83)*** (2.26)**
Female labor force participation 0.002 0.003 0.021 0.023 0.012 0.010 0.014
(0.07) (0.30) (1.89)* (1.98)** (1.21) (0.93) (1.34)
ln(AVA instability) 0.107 0.101
(2.43)** (1.96)**
ln(Exports instability) 0.110 0.107
(2.80)*** (3.02)***
ln(GDP per capita instability) 0.078 0.106
(2.14)** (2.96)***
ln(Growth volatility) 0.073
(3.76)***
Observations 169 596 400 399 525 523 525
Countries 63 137 105 105 132 132 132
R
2 0.31 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.13
Dependent variable in logs. AVA: agricultural value added. HP: Hodrick-Prescott.
The length of instability and volatility is 8 years.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
16
C
E
R
D
I,
E
tu
d
es
et
D
o
cu
m
en
ts,
E
2
0
0
6
.0
2
Table 2: Determinants of robbery rate: simple model (fixed effects) of the impact of instability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
HP HP
ln(GDP per capita) 10.423 5.283 6.656 6.869 5.902 5.994 6.022
(3.32)*** (3.55)*** (3.92)*** (4.16)*** (3.89)*** (3.93)*** (3.93)***
ln(GDP per capita)2 -0.618 -0.314 -0.373 -0.384 -0.335 -0.342 -0.348
(3.20)*** (3.60)*** (3.73)*** (3.93)*** (3.79)*** (3.86)*** (3.90)***
GDP growth rate -0.011 -0.018 -0.014 -0.014 -0.024 -0.021 -0.021
(0.66) (2.12)** (1.15) (1.16) (2.46)** (2.22)** (2.16)**
Death penalty 0.226 -0.248 -0.463 -0.470 -0.160 -0.143 -0.192
(0.38) (1.02) (1.49) (1.52) (0.65) (0.57) (0.78)
Gini index 0.008
(0.50)
Literacy rate -0.066
(1.54)
Urbanization rate -0.004 -0.028 -0.016 -0.018 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028
(0.12) (1.94)* (0.97) (1.09) (1.90)* (1.85)* (1.90)*
Male 15-64 year-old 0.024 0.113 -0.033 -0.020 0.104 0.103 0.103
(0.19) (2.19)** (0.48) (0.29) (2.04)** (2.01)** (2.00)**
Female labor force participation -0.011 0.057 0.054 0.054 0.065 0.068 0.064
(0.15) (2.14)** (1.67)* (1.68)* (2.43)** (2.50)** (2.37)**
ln(AVA instability) -0.008 0.007
(0.07) (0.05)
ln(Exports instability) 0.018 0.006
(0.14) (0.06)
ln(GDP per capita instability) 0.197 0.192
(1.73)* (1.67)*
ln(Growth volatility) 0.091
(1.81)*
Observations 130 274 234 233 269 269 269
Countries 53 88 76 76 87 87 87
R
2 0.42 0.37 0.42 0.43 0.39 0.39 0.38
Dependent variable in logs. AVA: agricultural value added. HP: Hodrick-Prescott.
The length of instability and volatility is 8 years.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Elasticity of homicide rate to instability depends on the length of instability
Number AVA instability Exports instability GDP per capita instability Growth volatility
of years EE HP EE HP EE HP
10 0.126** 0.135** 0.106** 0.105** 0.079** 0.105*** 0.090***
8 0.106** 0.101* 0.110*** 0.107*** 0.078** 0.106*** 0.073***
6 0.082*** 0.081** 0.118*** 0.105*** 0.066** 0.084*** 0.048***
5 0.085*** 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.094*** 0.057** 0.065** 0.039***
4 0.089*** 0.094*** 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.059** 0.071*** 0.033**
Dependent variable in logs. AVA: agricultural value added. EE: econometric estimation. HP: Hodrick-Prescott.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Elasticity of robbery rate to instability depends on the length of instability
Number AVA instability Exports instability GDP per capita instability Growth volatility
of years EE HP EE HP EE HP
10 -0.016 0.034 0.022 0.023 0.122 0.127 0.021
8 -0.008 0.007 0.018 0.006 0.197* 0.192 0.091*
6 -0.049 -0.044 0.001 -0.004 0.206** 0.203** 0.099**
5 -0.045 -0.041 -0.013 -0.003 0.228** 0.219** 0.086**
4 -0.026 -0.021 0.030 0.032 0.194** 0.217** 0.078***
Dependent variable in logs. AVA: agricultural value added. EE: econometric estimation. HP: Hodrick-Prescott.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Impact of instability on homicide rate in OECD and non OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HP HP
ln(GDP per capita) -0.188 -0.220 -0.289 -0.280 -0.278
(1.29) (1.49) (2.56)** (2.47)** (2.51)**
GDP growth rate -0.010 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004
(1.96)* (1.81)* (1.15) (1.43) (1.00)
Death penalty -0.044 -0.046 -0.034 -0.072 -0.064
(0.43) (0.45) (0.35) (0.75) (0.66)
Urbanization rate 0.009 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.001
(1.29) (1.43) (0.04) (0.03) (0.11)
Male 15-64 year-old 0.036 0.035 0.048 0.063 0.046
(1.11) (1.08) (2.17)** (2.57)** (2.11)**
Female labor force participation 0.019 0.021 0.012 0.009 0.012
(1.64) (1.78)* (1.15) (0.85) (1.21)
ln(AVA instability) 0.118 0.105
(1.98)** (1.57)
ln(Exports instability) 0.128 0.136
(2.42)** (2.73)***
ln(GDP per capita instability) 0.084 0.131
(1.99)** (3.08)***
ln(Growth volatility) 0.083
(3.87)***
ln(AVA instability)*OECD -0.075 -0.035
(0.90) (0.38)
ln(Exports instability)*OECD -0.073 -0.117
(1.21) (2.00)**
ln(GDP per capita instability)*OECD -0.054 -0.154
(0.89) (2.42)**
ln(Growth volatility)*OECD -0.056
(1.07)
Observations 400 399 525 523 525
Countries 105 105 132 132 132
R
2 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.13
Dependent variable in logs. AVA: agricultural value added. HP: Hodrick-Prescott.
The length of instability and volatility is 8 years.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 6: Impact of instability on robbery rate in OECD and non OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HP HP
ln(GDP per capita) 7.291 7.683 6.453 6.151 6.370
(3.85)*** (4.07)*** (4.21)*** (4.02)*** (4.13)***
ln(GDP per capita)2 -0.415 -0.435 -0.362 -0.349 -0.367
(3.73)*** (3.91)*** (4.08)*** (3.93)*** (4.10)***
GDP growth rate -0.013 -0.011 -0.027 -0.022 -0.022
(1.02) (0.91) (2.77)*** (2.33)** (2.32)**
Death penalty -0.563 -0.560 -0.225 -0.196 -0.222
(1.78)* (1.79)* (0.91) (0.77) (0.90)
Urbanization rate -0.019 -0.022 -0.030 -0.029 -0.028
(1.17) (1.28) (2.11)** (1.97)* (1.91)*
Male 15-64 year-old -0.020 -0.008 0.102 0.104 0.100
(0.30) (0.12) (2.01)** (2.01)** (1.94)*
Female labor force participation 0.054 0.056 0.059 0.063 0.055
(1.68)* (1.75)* (2.20)** (2.31)** (2.03)**
ln(AVA instability) 0.048 0.093
(0.25) (0.42)
ln(Exports instability) 0.122 0.126
(0.51) (0.57)
ln(GDP per capita instability) 0.356 0.278
(1.87)* (1.46)
ln(Growth volatility) 0.168
(2.43)**
ln(AVA instability)*OECD -0.147 -0.184
(0.67) (0.70)
ln(Exports instability)*OECD -0.248 -0.237
(0.89) (0.95)
ln(GDP per capita instability)*OECD -0.336 -0.182
(1.49) (0.78)
ln(Growth volatility)*OECD -0.164
(1.62)
Observations 234 233 269 269 269
Countries 76 76 87 87 87
R
2 0.43 0.44 0.40 0.39 0.39
Dependent variable in logs. AVA: agricultural value added. HP: Hodrick-Prescott.
The length of instability and volatility is 8 years.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 7: Elasticity of homicide rate to instability depending on the quality of institutions
(ICRG composite index)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HP HP
ln(GDP per capita) -0.402 -0.452 -0.237 -0.290 -0.270
(2.09)** (2.32)** (1.40) (1.70)* (1.61)
GDP growth rate -0.007 -0.006 0.001 -0.000 0.002
(1.06) (0.84) (0.14) (0.01) (0.31)
Death penalty -0.030 -0.026 -0.069 -0.072 -0.078
(0.22) (0.19) (0.49) (0.51) (0.57)
Urbanization rate 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.012 0.013
(0.94) (1.16) (1.51) (1.35) (1.50)
Male 15-64 year-old -0.000 0.001 0.034 0.054 0.022
(0.01) (0.02) (1.22) (1.66)* (0.76)
Female labor force participation 0.025 0.029 0.021 0.013 0.019
(1.41) (1.58) (1.27) (0.78) (1.18)
ICRG -0.015 -0.018 0.003 0.000 0.015
(1.44) (1.63) (0.58) (0.04) (2.50)**
ln(AVA instability) 0.497 0.473
(1.87)* (1.61)
ln(Exports instability) 0.108 0.187
(0.37) (0.62)
ln(GDP per capita instability) 0.235 0.370
(0.83) (1.30)
ln(Growth volatility) 0.261
(2.34)**
ln(AVA instability)*ICRG -0.007 -0.006
(1.80)* (1.62)
ln(Exports instability)*ICRG 0.000 -0.001
(0.03) (0.27)
ln(GDP per capita instability)*ICRG -0.003 -0.005
(0.75) (1.31)
ln(Growth volatility)*ICRG -0.003
(1.99)**
Observations 312 312 385 383 385
Countries 87 87 106 106 106
R
2 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.09
Dependent variable in logs. AVA: agricultural value added. HP: Hodrick-Prescott.
The length of instability and volatility is 8 years.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 8: Elasticity of robbery rate to instability depending on the quality of institutions
(ICRG composite index)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
HP HP
ln(GDP per capita) 2.796 2.986 3.184 2.885 3.053
(1.70)* (1.81)* (1.94)* (1.72)* (1.83)*
ln(GDP per capita)2 -0.167 -0.181 -0.191 -0.177 -0.190
(1.76)* (1.89)* (2.05)** (1.86)* (2.02)**
GDP growth rate -0.031 -0.028 -0.025 -0.018 -0.016
(2.52)** (2.34)** (2.20)** (1.56) (1.42)
Death penalty -0.525 -0.523 -0.034 -0.065 -0.072
(2.08)** (2.09)** (0.14) (0.26) (0.30)
Urbanization rate -0.009 -0.010 -0.022 -0.023 -0.019
(0.46) (0.49) (1.33) (1.36) (1.12)
Male 15-64 year-old -0.115 -0.101 0.072 0.075 0.066
(1.72)* (1.53) (1.43) (1.43) (1.26)
Female labor force participation 0.014 0.017 0.045 0.046 0.045
(0.45) (0.54) (1.47) (1.46) (1.42)
ICRG -0.016 -0.027 -0.022 -0.017 -0.003
(0.75) (1.14) (2.47)** (1.95)* (0.35)
ln(AVA instability) 0.462 0.550
(1.08) (1.20)
ln(Exports instability) -0.126 0.077
(0.31) (0.18)
ln(GDP per capita instability) 0.816 0.519
(1.40) (0.83)
ln(Growth volatility) 0.404
(1.79)*
ln(AVA instability)*ICRG -0.006 -0.007
(1.08) (1.20)
ln(Exports instability)*ICRG 0.001 -0.002
(0.21) (0.31)
ln(GDP per capita instability)*ICRG -0.008 -0.005
(1.14) (0.64)
ln(Growth volatility)*ICRG -0.004
(1.36)
Observations 196 195 217 217 217
Countries 65 65 71 71 71
R
2 0.41 0.41 0.33 0.30 0.31
Dependent variable in logs. AVA: agricultural value added. HP: Hodrick-Prescott.
The length of instability and volatility is 8 years.
Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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